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A large empirical literature ﬁnds that there is too little international trade, and too much intra-national trade
to be rationalized by observed international trade costs such as tariﬀs and transport costs. The literature
uses frameworks in which goods are assumed to be produced in just one stage. This paper investigates
whether the multi-stage nature of production helps explain the home bias in trade. I show that multi-stage
production magniﬁes the eﬀects of trade costs. I then calibrate a multi-stage production model to the U.S.
and Canada. I solve the model with measures of trade costs constructed from data on tariﬀs, transport costs,
and wholesale distribution margins. The model can explain about 3/8 of the Canada border eﬀect; this is
three times more than what a calibrated one-stage model can explain. The model also explains a good deal
of Canada’s vertical specialization trade. Finally, a reverse engineering exercise suggests that the unknown
or unobserved component of trade costs is smaller than observed trade costs.
JEL Classiﬁcation code: F1, F4
Keywords: border eﬀect, multi-stage production, trade costs, U.S.-Canada trade, vertical specialization,
calibration, home bias in international trade1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How integrated are goods markets across countries? There is a simple integration benchmark
that arises from several well known models of international trade. Consider a frictionless world —
international trade costs are zero — in which complete specialization occurs. Then, the fraction of
output that is exported by a country equals one minus the country’s share of world output.1 For
example, Canada’s share of the G7 countries’ merchandise production in 1999 was 4 percent. The
frictionless benchmark would predict 96 percent of Canada’s production should be exported and
4 percent should be sold domestically. In fact, 52 percent was exported and 48 percent was sold
domestically. This pattern of international and intra-national trade suggests that Canada may not
be highly integrated; there may be large frictions or costs inhibiting Canada’s international trade.
Indeed, there is a large empirical literature that examines the extent of integration. This research
has studied many sets of countries and regions and many time periods, and has repeatedly found
a large “border eﬀect”. There is too little international trade and too much intra-national trade
to be rationalized by the standard, observed measures of trade costs — tariﬀs and transport costs,
in particular — which add up to about 5 to 10 percent for high-income countries. Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004, 2003) is the most theoretically consistent research in this literature; they ﬁnd
that the trade patterns between and within the U.S. and Canada in 1993 can be rationalized only
by international trade costs of 91 percent. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001) summarize these ﬁndings as
the “home bias in trade” puzzle.2
The empirical research mentioned above is based on frameworks in which goods are produced in
one stage. All of the value-added occurs in a single country. In reality, however, we know that most
goods are produced in multiple, sequential stages. Semiconductors, for example, are produced in at
least three stages. First, there is the wafer manufacturing stage; then there is the fabrication stage
in which circuits are etched onto the wafers; ﬁnally, there is the packaging (wafers are cut apart
into individual semiconductors) and testing stage. Automobiles are also produced in at least three
sequential stages. Are there any manufactured goods that are not produced in multiple stages?
1Under incomplete specialization, as long as the share of a country’s total purchases of, for example, steel, that
are from a particular steel producing country equals the steel producing country’s share of world steel output, the
result still holds. Consumers are assumed to have identical, homothetic preferences. See Deardorﬀ (1998).
2The estimate from Anderson and van Wincoop is for an elasticity of substitution of 5. McCallum (1995) was the
ﬁrst to discover a large border eﬀect. Trade between a pair of Canadian provinces was 22 times larger than trade
between an otherwise identical Canadian province - U.S. state pair. Other border eﬀect research includes that by Wei
(1996), Helliwell (1998), Anderson and Smith (1999), Nitsch (2000), Head and Ries (2001), Head and Mayer (2002),
Hillberry (2002), Evans (2003, 2006), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Chen (2004), and Combes et al. (2005).
This research tends to estimate border eﬀects between 10 and 20. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) is the most
theoretical consistent estimation of the border eﬀect; however, their estimate, 10.5 is fairly close to other estimates.
1Of course, in these frameworks, the single stage assumption is not taken to be literally true;
rather, the production function can be thought of as a reduced-form amalgam of a multiple, se-
quential stage process. However, the maintained assumption is that the nature of production — the
mapping of production stages to regions, for example — is invariant to changes in trade costs. In
other words, changes in trade costs may alter which country or region produces the (entire) good,
but there is no change in the underlying nature of production. For many research questions this
assumption is appropriate. However, in the context of the home bias in trade puzzle, this paper
shows that the assumption leaves out forces that are quantitatively important. The reduced-form
production function does change in response to changes in trade costs; this change is the source of
two magniﬁcation eﬀects.
One eﬀect is that if diﬀerent stages are produced in diﬀerent countries — vertical specialization —
then, as goods cross national borders while they are in-process, they incur the trade costs multiple
times. Hence, the friction limiting vertical specialization is a multiple of the standard friction
limiting international trade.3 The second eﬀe c ti sm o r es u b t l ea n di sb e s tc o n v e y e db ya ne x a m p l e .
A U.S. consumer can buy cars wholly made in the United States or cars assembled in Canada from
U.S.-made components. There is a tariﬀ on imports of cars made in Canada. Note that with the
second (vertically specialized) production process, the tariﬀ is applied to the entire car, even though
only assembly occurs in Canada. The relevant or eﬀective trade cost in this example is the tariﬀ
divided by the share of assembly value-added in the total cost. The smaller the assembly value-
added share, the larger is the eﬀective tariﬀ. The magniﬁed eﬀect of the tariﬀ exerts a magniﬁed
eﬀect on vertically specialized production, leading to a magniﬁed reduction in international trade.
The goal of this paper is to quantitatively assess the extent to which multi-stage production
can help explain the home bias in trade puzzle. I calibrate a multi-stage production model to
match gross output and value-added per worker in the United States and in each of two broad
regions of Canada, Ontario-Quebec and the rest of Canada.4 I also construct measures of trade
costs within and between the United States and Canada. The costs include tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ
barriers, transport costs, and wholesale distribution costs; also, I compute separate costs for the
auto industry and the non-auto industries.5.I ﬁnd that the trade-weighted average of the costs
3Yi (2003) shows that this channel can help explain the growth of world trade, because trade cost reductions have
am a g n i ﬁed eﬀect operating through increased vertical specialization.
4In the calibration, I employ an elasticity of substitution of 5. This elasticity is on the lower end of the range of
estimates, which are typically between 5 and 10. However, these estimates are potentially problematic, because they
do not take into account multi-stage production, which could lead to an upward bias. I show this in the next section.
5The auto industry accounts for only about ﬁve percent of total merchandise (agriculture, mining, and manufac-
turing) value-added in the the two countries, but it accounts for more than 25 percent of merchandise trade between
2involved in shipping a good between Canada and the United State in 1990 was 14.8 percent. I
then solve the model with these trade costs and examine its implications for trade ﬂows within and
between the United States and Canada.
The model’s implications for trade can be summarized by estimating a gravity regression of
the model implied trade ﬂows on each region’s income, the distance between the two regions, and
a dummy variable for whether the two regions are in the same country. I also run the regression
with the actual trade ﬂows, and then compare the coeﬃcients on the border dummy variable. The
estimated border dummy coeﬃcient from the regression with the model implied trade is more than
2/3 of the coeﬃcient from the regression with the actual trade. The border eﬀect is the exponential
of that coeﬃcient; the model can explain almost 3/8 of the border eﬀect. On both dimensions,
the border coeﬃcient and the border eﬀect, the model explains a good deal of intra-national and
international trade ﬂows from international trade costs of just 14.8 percent. To assess the “value
added” of multi-stage production, I calibrate and solve a one-stage version of the model that is a
special case of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model. The one-stage model can explain less than
1/3 of the border coeﬃcient and only 1/9 of the border eﬀect.
A test of the model is its implications for vertical specialization trade. The model almost exactly
matches the rest-of-Canada’s vertical specialization trade, and captures more than two-thirds of
Ontario-Quebec’s. However, the model explains only about one-third of the vertical specialization
in Ontario-Quebec’s auto industry, and only about one-half of the auto share of Ontario-Quebec’s
overall vertical specialization. Hence, the implications for overall vertical specialization accord well
with the data, but the model does not fully capture the important role of autos.
I also use the multi-stage model to address the following counterfactual: what level of in-
ternational trade costs would be needed for the model-implied regression to generate the border
dummy coeﬃcient in the data? They would need to be 26.1 percent. With observed trade costs at
14.8 percent, this result implies that the unknown or unobserved trade costs are smaller than the
observed.
Overall, my results suggest an interpretation in which multi-stage production, in conjunction
with observable trade cost measures, can explain much of the pattern of intra-national and inter-
national trade. This interpretation also accounts for much of the vertical specialization trade. In
addition, when observed trade costs are 14.8 percent and total trade costs are 26.1 percent, it means
the two countries. This owes in large part to the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact, which took eﬀect in 1965. The pact was
the template for the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1989. I ﬁnd that the cost of shipping auto goods between
Canada and the United States was about half the cost of non-auto goods.
3that existing policy-related barriers, such as tariﬀ rates, and technology-related barriers, such as
transportation costs, are still an important component of overall trade costs. Tariﬀ reductions and
improvements in transportation infrastructure still matter.
The most closely related papers are Hillberry and Hummels (2008) and Rossi-Hansberg (2005).
The former documents the fact that diﬀerent stages of production tend to be located close to
one another. The latter presents a model with intermediate and ﬁnal goods, an agglomeration
externality, and endogenous ﬁrm location. A change in tariﬀs leads to changes in the location
of production, which aﬀects productivity in a way that magniﬁes the eﬀects of the tariﬀ change.
Neither paper conducts a quantitative analysis of the importance of multi-stage production in
explaining patterns of intra-national and international trade.
Section 2 presents the model. Also, for a special case of the model, I derive an analytical
expression for the border eﬀect. The border eﬀect is a power of the border eﬀect from a one-
stage model, where the power is increasing in the share of ﬁrst stage goods used in second stage
production. The special case facilitates the intuition for how multi-stage production magniﬁes the
eﬀects of trade costs. Section 3 presents the calibration and solution method, and the results are
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, I lay out the model and describe the intuition for how multi-stage production
can magnify the eﬀects of international trade barriers. The model is a Ricardian model of trade
in which trade and specialization patterns are determined by relative technology diﬀerences across
countries. The model is essentially a multi-stage, multi-region version of Eaton and Kortum (2002),
a model that has been successful in ﬁtting international trade data. It also draws from Yi (2003).
Both papers extend and/or generalize the celebrated Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977;
hereafter, DFS) continuum-of-goods Ricardian model.6
The basic geographic unit is a region. Countries consist of more than one region. Countries have
“border” barriers, but regions do not. Each region possesses technologies for producing goods along
a [0,1] continuum. Each good is produced in two stages. Both stages are tradable. Consequently,
there are I2 possible production patterns, where I is the total number of regions, for each good on
the continuum. Goods are produced from labor and intermediates. The model determines which
6In all three papers, changes in trade occur along the extensive margin. Hillberry and Hummels (2008) provide
detailed micro-evidence supporting this feature.
4production pattern or patterns occur in equilibrium.
2.1 Technologies and Firms




1(z)1−θ1Mi(z)θ1 z ∈ [0,1] (1)
where Ai
1(z) is region i’s total factor productivity associated with stage 1 good z,a n dli
1(z) and
Mi(z) are region i’s inputs of labor and aggregate intermediate Mi used to produce yi
1(z).T h e
share of intermediates in production is θ1.7 This ﬁrst stage is a Cobb-Douglas version of the
production function in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
Stage 2 goods are also produced from labor and intermediates; however, the intermediates are








1(z)θ2 z ∈ [0,1] (2)
where xi
1(z) is region i’s use of y1(z) for stage 2 production, Ai
2(z) is region i’s total factor produc-
tivity associated with stage 2 good z,a n dli
2(z) is region i’s labor used in producing yi
2(z).T h e
share of intermediates for this stage is θ2.
Stage 2 goods are used for ﬁnal consumption or to produce the aggregate intermediate, Mi.








where m(z) is the amount of the stage 2 good used to produce M.
When either stage 1 or stage 2 goods cross regional or national borders, they incur transport
costs, as well as wholesale distribution costs. These are the costs associated with distance or ge-
ography. I model both costs as iceberg costs. Speciﬁcally, if 1 unit of either stage of good z is
shipped from region i to region j,t h e n1/(1 + dij(z)) < 1 units arrive in region j. The gross
ad valorem tariﬀ equivalent of these costs is 1+dij(z). There is an additional iceberg cost, the
national border cost 1+bij(z). This barrier is a stand-in for tariﬀ rates, non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs),
and other border costs associated with regulations, time, and national culture that are relevant for
7The ﬁrst stage of production in this model diﬀers from that in Yi (2003) in its inclusion of intermediates. This
facilitates matching both gross output, trade, and value-added (GDP) in the calibration.
5international trade.8 Consequently, I assume the gross border cost exceeds one only when regions
i and j are located in diﬀerent countries. Total trade costs, 1+τij(z), are given by the product of
the distance costs and the border costs: 1+τij(z)=( 1+dij(z))(1 + bij(z))
In terms of the number of countries and goods, the most general Ricardian framework is that
developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002, hereafter, EK). I adopt a key part of the framework, which
is the use of the Frechét distribution as the probability distribution of total factor productivities:
F(Ak)=e−TA
−n
k k =1 ,2 (3)
The mean of A is increasing in T. n is a smoothness parameter that governs the heterogeneity
of the draws from the productivity distribution. The larger n is, the lower the heterogeneity or
variance of A. EK show that n plays the same role in their model as σ−1,w h e r eσ is the elasticity of
substitution between goods, in the monopolistic competition or Armington aggregator-based trade
models.9
Firms maximize proﬁts taking prices as given. Speciﬁcally, in each period, they hire labor and
purchase inputs in order to produce their output, which they sell at market prices.




1(z) − PiMi(z) (4)
where pi
1(z) is the factory gate price of yi
1(z), wi is the wage rate in region i,a n dPi is the price of
the aggregate intermediate.










assuming the cheapest source for intermediates used to produce region i’s stage 2 good z is region
8To the extent that the barrier includes tariﬀs, I assume that tariﬀ revenue is “thrown in the ocean.”
9The Frechét distribution facilitates a straightforward solution of the EK model in a many-country world with non-
zero border barriers. Unfortunately, such a straightforward solution does not carry over in my multi-stage framework.
This is because my framework requires two draws from the Frechét distribution. Neither the sum nor the product of
Frechét distributions has a Frechét distribution. I thank Sam Kortum for pointing this out to me.
The EK model has an input-output production structure, which implies vertical specialization, and leads generally
to more trade ﬂows than in a model without this structure. However, this structure is invariant to changes in trade
barriers, which plays a role in the result that the elasticity of trade ﬂows with respect to trade barriers is essentially
the same as in the standard trade model. This invariance in production structure to changes in trade barriers is also
true for the nested CES frameworks that are commonly used in the computable general equilibrium literature.
6j. pi
2(z) is the factory gate price of yi
2(z),a n d1+τ
ji
1 (z) is the total trade cost incurred in shipping
the stage 1 good z from region j to region i.












2 (z)),w h e r e1+τ
ji
2 (z) is the total trade
cost incurred in shipping the stage 2 good z from region j to region i.
2.2 Households









subject to the budget constraint:
1 Z
0
pi(z)ci(z)dz = wiLi (8)
where ci(z) is consumption of good z,a n dpi(z) is the price, inclusive of transport and border





2 (z)). Note that the price of the aggregate consumption bundle is Pi.
2.3 Equilibrium
All factor and goods markets are characterized by perfect competition. The following market














1(z)=0 ,a n ds i m i l a r l yf o rl
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2(z).












1(z) is the total trade cost incurred by shipping the stage 1 good from its cheapest















If these conditions hold, then each region’s exports equals its imports, i.e., balanced trade holds.
In o wd e ﬁne the equilibrium of this model:















,z∈ [0,1],i=1 ,...I, such that the ﬁrst
order conditions to the households’ maximization problem 7, the ﬁrst order conditions to the ﬁrms’
maximization problems 4, 5, and 6, as well as the market clearing conditions 9,10, 11, and 12 are
satisﬁed.
2.4 Vertical Specialization and Border Eﬀects
In addition to delivering implications for intra-national and international trade, the model will
deliver implications for vertical specialization. In this section, I deﬁne vertical specialization and
present some measures of it for Canada, as well as for two sets of provinces within Canada. I also
derive for two special cases of the model the link between trade costs and border eﬀects. These
special cases will highlight the magniﬁcation eﬀects from multi-stage production.
Under frictionless trade, there will be complete specialization. Each stage of each good will be
produced by only one region. Intra-national and international trade will occur so that agents will
be able to consume all goods. Under positive trade costs, complete specialization may no longer
occur. A stage of a good may be produced in more than one region. If the trade costs are high
8enough, autarky will occur, and each region will produce every stage of every good.
In o wd e ﬁne vertical specialization. In previous research, D. Hummels, J. Ishii, D. Rapoport,
and I have documented the increasing importance of vertical specialization in OECD and other
countries.11 In order to accommodate regions as the basic geographic unit, I modify the deﬁnition
from Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001):
1. Goods are produced in multiple, sequential stages.
2. Two or more regions provide value-added in the good’s production sequence.
3. At least one region must use imported inputs in its stage of the production process, and some
of the resulting output must be exported.
In this context, imports and exports refer to shipments from one region to another; in particular,
these ﬂows can occur within a country. Figure 1 illustrates an example of vertical specialization
involving three regions. Region 1 produces intermediate goods and exports them to region 2.
Region 2 combines the imported intermediates with other inputs and value-added to produce a
ﬁnal good or another intermediate good in the production chain. Finally, region 2 exports some of
its output to region 3. If either the imported intermediates or exports are absent, then there is no
vertical specialization.
Clearly, this deﬁnition of vertical specialization is broader than and encompasses the HIY deﬁ-
nition. I call the HIY deﬁnition of vertical specialization, international vertical specialization, i.e.,
it is the vertical specialization in which all the relevant trade ﬂows are between countries.
A necessary condition for vertically specialized production of a good to occur is for one region
to be relatively more productive in the ﬁrst stage of production and another region to be relatively
more productive in the second stage. Under frictionless trade, if relative wages are “between” these
relative productivities, then this necessary condition is also suﬃcient.
Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (HIY) develop two measures of international vertical specialization.







where k and i denote country and good, respectively. A regional version of VSwould re-interpret
k as a region.
11See Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), and Yi (2003).














As discussed in HIY, ideally, VS ki would be calculated at the level of individual goods, and
then aggregated up. These data do not exist, at either the country or regional level. HIY relied on
national input-output tables, which provide industry-level data on imported intermediates, gross
output, and exports.12 HIY ﬁnd that VS Canada,e x p r e s s e da sas h a r eo ft o t a le x p o r t s ,w a s0.27 in
1990. That is, for every $1 worth of exports by Canada in that year, the value of imported inputs
embodied in the exports was $0.27. For motor vehicles, according to HIY, the VSshare is higher,
0.51.13
Using the HIY industry-level VSnumbers, as well as provincial-level export data by industry, I
12An additional advantage of using input-output tables is that they facilitate measuring the indirect import content
of exports. Inputs may be imported, for example, and used to produce an intermediate good that is itself not exported,
but rather, used as an input to produce a good that is. See Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999, 2001).
13How much conﬁd e n c ed ow eh a v ei nt h e s ei n p u t - o u t p u tc a l c u l ations? For autos, an alternative measure of
VS Canada,autos can be calculated. I use data from Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (2000). Owing to data limitations,
VS Canada,autos involves imports from the U.S. only. The U.S. exported about $15.3 billion of parts for further
manufacture to Canadian aﬃliates of U.S. auto manufacturers in 1989. (1989 was a benchmark year for the BEA’s
Direct Investment Abroad data. All dollar numbers are U.S. dollars) In addition, 80% of Canada’s auto production
was exported to the U.S. in that year. (Ward’s Automotive Yearbook). Hence, $12.2 billion of Canada’s motor
vehicle exports were embodied inputs from the U.S. Total Canadian motor vehicle exports to the U.S. in 1989 was
$26 billion. Consequently, according to this calculation, 47 percent of the value of Canada’s exports of motor vehicles
to the U.S. consisted of inputs from the U.S. This number is very close to the 51 percent value from the input-output
table calculation in HIY.
10impute international VSin 1990 for the sub-national regions in my calibrated model. These values,
expressed as a share of merchandise GDP, are presented in Table 1 below.
Table 1: International VS (as share of region GDP)
Sector \ Region Canada Ontario-Quebec Rest-of-Canada
All 0.233 0.307 0.110
Autos 0.111 0.173 0.0073
Non-autos 0.122 0.134 0.103
Sources: HIY (1999, 2001), Statistics Canada, OECD, author’s calculations
Notice that autos account for almost half of Canada’s VS. Also, almost all of auto’s VS is
from Ontario-Quebec. Almost all of Rest-of-Canada’s VS is in non-autos. I will test the model by
comparing these VSdata against their model counterparts.
2.4.1 Border Eﬀect in the Standard Model
To demonstrate how multi-stage production can magnify trade costs into relatively large border
eﬀects, I ﬁrst develop an analytical relation linking trade costs to border eﬀects for a special case
of the model with two countries, two regions per country, and only one stage of production. This is
just the EK model extended to include two regions per country. Also, there are no trade costs other
than border costs, i.e., in this example trade costs and border costs are identical. To facilitate the
discussion, I consider a symmetric case. I assume that the regions within a country have the same
labor endowment and their (total factor) productivities are drawn from the same distribution. This
implies that wages and GDPs are equalized across regions within a country.
A country’s productivity for a good is deﬁned as the maximum productivity (of that good)
across the two regions: Ah(z)=m a x [ Ah1(z),A h2(z)],w h e r eh denotes the home country. As in
DFS, without loss of generality, the goods can then be arranged in descending order of the ratio
of home productivity to foreign productivity, so that Ar(z)=
Ah(z)
Af(z) is declining in z. International




where zh is the cutoﬀ z that separates home and foreign production for the home market. The
11home country produces all goods on the interval [0,zh] and imports all goods on the interval [zh,1].
whLh is home country GDP. Imports are “blown up” by a factor of 1
1−θ1 owing to the presence
of intermediates. The foreign country produces all goods on the interval [zf,1] and imports all
goods on the interval [0,zf]; consequently, foreign international imports are
zfwfLf
1−θ1 .I n t r a - n a t i o n a l




This follows from the symmetry assumption about each of the two regions.




where Intra refers to intra-national trade, Inter refers to international trade, the subscript b refers
to actual border costs, and the subscript 0 refers to zero border costs. It is a double ratio: the ratio
of intra-national trade under actual border costs to intra-national trade under zero border costs
divided by the corresponding ratio for international trade. The border eﬀect can also be thought
of as the ratio of intra-national trade to international trade under actual border costs relative to
what that ratio would be under zero border costs. Unlike the empirical border eﬀect estimated
directly from a gravity regression, the AvW border eﬀect is not a model-free concept, because it
relies on the counterfactual exercise of solving for trade ﬂows when border costs are zero. While
the two border eﬀects are clearly related, I call the AvW concept the theoretical border eﬀect, to







(1 − zb)/(1 − z0)
(17)
where the superscript h has been suppressed for convenience. In the one-stage model, then, the
denominator of the theoretical border eﬀect is (1−zb)/(1−z0) and the numerator is given by zb/z0.
Note that the term with intermediates, 1 − θ1, drops out in the above equation.
At this point, I make a further symmetry assumption, which is that the regions across countries
are also identical in terms of both labor endowments and productivities. This assumption implies
14Table 5 of AvW (2003) gives the estimate of their border eﬀect (10.5), as well as the estimate of the empirical
border eﬀect (16.5). As AvW show, the theoretical border eﬀect is structural, while the empirical border eﬀect is
essentially a reduced form. I use the latter in this paper merely as a way to characterize the data; I do not give the
coeﬃcients any structural interpretation.
12that wages and GDPs are equalized across countries, and relative wages and GDPs (across countries)
are invariant to border costs. Assuming the productivities follow a Frechét distribution, the relative











where Ar(z) can also be interpreted as the fraction of goods z where the home productivity relative
to the foreign productivity is at least A.15 As discussed above, n is analogous to an elasticity in
that a larger n implies a ﬂatter or more “elastic” Ar(z). In the appendix, I show that the solution




It is easy to see that under zero border costs, zh
0 = z
f
0 =0 .5. The denominator of the theoretical




This is clearly decreasing in the border cost; through international trade alone, the greater the
border cost, the greater the border eﬀect. Note that the higher the elasticity n, the greater the
eﬀect of the border cost on international trade.
The numerator of the theoretical border eﬀect (intra-national trade under border costs divided
by intra-national trade under free trade) is:
2(1 + b)n
1+( 1+b)n (21)
This is increasing in the border cost — as the cost between countries increases, intra-national
trade increases. The reason for this is essentially the idea that specialization implies that goods must
be traded somewhere. If they are not traded internationally, they will typically be traded intra-
nationally. This is a key insight from AvW. More speciﬁcally, consider a home country consumer
in one of the regions. Under border costs, the fraction of goods purchased from home producers
increases. Because the two regions within the home country are symmetric, this implies that the
fraction of goods purchased from the other home region’s producers, that is, intra-national trade,
increases.
15See footnote 15 in EK (2002).
13Combining the numerator and denominator yields the overall theoretical border eﬀect, which is
given by:
(1 + b)n (22)
This expression is quite intuitive. Note that the border eﬀect is independent of the intermediate
input share θ1. The presence of intermediates is necessary, but not suﬃcient, for magniﬁcation.
2.4.2 Border Eﬀect in the Multi-Stage Model
With the multi-stage model, deriving analytical expressions for the theoretical border eﬀect is
considerably more diﬃcult. To provide insight into the model, I work with a special case that has
the virtue of yielding an analytical expression for the border eﬀect. I assume that the ﬁrst stage of
production is produced in the country that ultimately consumes the second stage good; the second
stage production location is determined by the model. Thus, if a U.S. consumer seeks to purchase
an automobile, the parts and components are assumed to be produced in the United States, while
ﬁnal assembly can occur either in the United States or Canada. This assumption ensures that there
is international vertical specialization with only one Frechét distribution of productivities compared
across regions and countries for each good, which means much of the analysis from the previous
sub-section can be applied here.
For goods consumed by the home country, the two possible production methods at the country
level are denoted by HH and HF,w h e r eHF means that the ﬁrst stage of production occurs in
the Home country and the second stage of production occurs in the Foreign country. Note that
production method HF involves international vertical specialization: the foreign country imports
inputs and exports its resulting output. Similarly, for goods consumed by the foreign country,
the two possible production methods are denoted by FF and FH, where international vertical
specialization occurs with FH. I continue to assume that there are four identically sized regions;
moreover, each region’s productivities for both stages of production are drawn from the same
distribution.16
If the goods are arranged in descending order of the ratio of home to foreign productivity of
stage 2 production, then the analysis in the previous sub-section applies. In particular, zh denotes
the cutoﬀ that separates home and foreign production of stage 2 goods for the home market.
16This latter assumption implies that the production method HH has four ex ante equally likely production
methods distinguished by region: stage 1 can be produced in either of the two home countries’ regions and likewise
for stage 2 production. Two of these production methods involve intra-national vertical specialization.
14International imports for the home country are now given by
(1 + θ2)(1 − zh)wL;
1 − θ1θ2
(23)
intra-national imports are given by
(1+θ2)zhwL
















































term in the exponent. The
term shows clearly that multi-stage production magniﬁes the eﬀects of border costs. If θ2 =0 .5,






term. The ﬁrst force is the multiple border crossing or back-and-forth
force. With the HF production process, the ﬁrst stage encounters a border cost twice; recall that
the share of stage 1 goods in stage 2 production is θ2.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,t h et o t a le ﬀect of the barrier
owing to this force is 1+θ2. The second force is the “eﬀective rate of protection” force, because the
concept is analogous to the concept from the literature of that name. The trade-oﬀ between HH
and HF hinges on the second stage of production. The key idea is that the relevant or eﬀective
border cost is the border cost divided by the share of the second stage’s value-added in the total
cost. This is because the second stage is the marginal production stage, but the border cost is
applied to the entire good. If the second stage value-added accounts for one-third of the total cost,
for example, then the eﬀective border cost is three times the nominal border cost. This explains
the 1
1−θ2 term.





term is via the following decomposition. In the HF pro-
duction process, the ﬁrst stage encounters a border cost when it is shipped to the foreign country.
15The border cost is equivalent to a cost on the second stage of production of (1 + b)
θ2
1−θ2.Ab o r d e r
cost is encountered again when the ﬁnal good is shipped back to the home country from the foreign
country. The border cost is applied to the entire good. Consequently, a cost of 1+b imposed on
the entire HF-produced good is eﬀectively a cost of (1+b)
1
1−θ2 on the second stage of production.
The total eﬀect is the product of these two forces. If the border cost rises, the cost of producing
(internationally) vertically specialized goods rises by a multiple of the cost.
2.4.3 Discussion
The above analysis focused on a special case of the model. In the general case, in which the
locations of both stage 2 and stage 1 production are endogenous, the margins described by the
special case, i.e., HH vs. HF, will arise only for a fraction of the goods. For the other goods, the
margins will not involve the two forces described above. One way of thinking about the model,
then, is that it is a combination of the special case with its magniﬁed border eﬀect and other cases
in which the border eﬀect is the standard one. Consequently, in the general model, the overall
eﬀect is magniﬁed, but the extent of the magniﬁcation is smaller than what is given by (26).
In this particular example, the share of intermediates in stage 1 production is not relevant for
the border eﬀect. What matters is the share of intermediates in stage 2 production. This is because
it is these intermediates that can either stay at home or be shipped abroad for ﬁnal assembly and
then shipped back home. The greater the share of intermediates used in stage 2 production, the
greater the fraction of the ﬁnal good that crosses the border multiple times, and the larger the
magniﬁcation eﬀect. More generally, both θ1 and θ2 matter for the magniﬁcation eﬀect.
The key to the magniﬁcation eﬀect is that vertical specialization is endogenous; as border costs
rise, alternative, non (internationally) vertically specialized production processes become relatively
more eﬃcient. That the model delivers changes in the nature of production and specialization as
barriers change is what gives the model “kick” relative to the frameworks employed by AvW or
EK, for example.17
It is common in the empirical literature to estimate the relevant elasticity of substitution from
a regression of trade ﬂows on a measure of trade costs. However, in the presence of multi-stage
17EK has intermediate goods, and has vertical specialization; why then, does it not have the magniﬁcation eﬀect?
As stated above, the production function in EK has just one stage. However, EK’s trade cost, dni,c o u l db er e -
interpreted to include all the trade costs associated with the back-and-forth ﬂows of goods from country i to country
n. In other words, EK’s estimates could be interpreted as eﬀective trade costs, not the actual trade barriers that are
imposed by governments or technologies. But, EK would be silent on the mapping between these measured barriers
and the eﬀective costs. My model provides that mapping.
16production, what would be estimated would be the exponent on (26). It would be the product of





. This suggests that estimates of substitution
elasticities are upwardly biased.
Increasingly, countries apply tariﬀs only to the value-added that occurs abroad. These arrange-
ments tend to arise speciﬁcally to increase opportunities for vertical specialization. When tariﬀs
are applied only to value-added, no part of the ﬁnal good is taxed more than once. However, from
the above discussion, it should be clear that even under value-added tariﬀs, the magniﬁcation eﬀect
still exists. This is because stage 2 is still the marginal stage, and even if a tariﬀ is levied on the
ﬁnal good only once, that tariﬀ is still magniﬁed via the eﬀective rate of protection force. To a ﬁrst





. The appendix gives the derivation
of the border eﬀect in this case.
How does the magniﬁcation eﬀect change with the number of stages of production? Obviously,
this depends on how the extra stages enter. Consider a symmetric production function in which
there are 2N stages, N is an integer, with each stage contributing 1/2N in value-added, and with
each stage’s productivity drawn from the same distribution. Let us consider two examples. In the
ﬁrst example, suppose the home consumer can purchase goods via only two possible production
methods; one method involves involves stages 1,3,5,...,2N − 1 produced at home while stages
2,4,6,...,2N are produced abroad. The other method involves all 2N stages made at home. Here,
the back and forth force is maximized and equals N + 1
2.T h ee ﬀective rate of protection force is
1
1/2 =2 , because the marginal production stages’ value-added account for 1
2 of the value of the good.
Hence, the total magniﬁcation eﬀect is 2N +1 , or the number of stages plus one. In the second
example, suppose again there are only two possible production methods; one method involves stages
1,2,3,...,2N −1 produced at home, and stage 2N produced abroad. The other method involves all
2N stages made at home. Here, the back and forth force is 2 − 1
2N, which is less than in the ﬁrst
example whenever N>1. On the other hand, the eﬀective rate of protection force is 1
1/2N =2 N.
The total magniﬁcation eﬀect is 4N − 1.T h et o t a le ﬀect in the second example exceeds the total
eﬀect in the ﬁrst example whenever 2N exceeds 2. As with the special case presented above, both
examples highlight cases that deliver the maximal magniﬁcation and border eﬀect. These examples
suggest two lessons. First, the magniﬁcation eﬀect may be increasing in the number of stages, but
note that the rate of increase linear. Second, production methods that maximize the back-and-forth
force may not maximize the eﬀective rate of protection force.
Summarizing, the discussion above suggests the following interpretation of the relation between
17multi-stage production and the border eﬀect. In a world with multi-stage production, trade costs
lead to a larger decrease in international trade, and a larger increase in intra-national trade, than
what would be implied by a standard trade model, as indicated by (25). International trade
decreases by more because of the two mechanisms discussed above: 1) the back-and-forth aspect of
vertical specialization implies that at least some stages of the good are aﬀected multiple times by
trade costs and 2) the barrier is applied to the entire good, but the marginal unit of production is a
single stage, whose value-added is just a fraction of the cost of the entire good. Because international
trade decreases by more, intra-national trade increases by more; moreover, the ensuing increase in
intra-national vertical specialization also adds to intra-national ﬂows. Overall, the presence of
multi-stage production gives rise to a larger border eﬀect from a given trade cost than in the
standard model.
3M o d e l C a l i b r a t i o n a n d T r a d e C o s t s
I now calibrate the multi-stage model presented in sections 2.1-2.3. I focus on Canada, because
it has generated the most attention in the empirical border eﬀect literature. The United States
is by far Canada’s largest trading partner; consequently, the calibration will involve these two
countries.18 A central fact in U.S.-Canada trade is the importance of motor vehicles (hereafter,
autos).19 In 1990, this industry accounted for 5 percent of value-added in merchandise-producing
industries in the two countries; however, it accounted for over one-fourth of U.S.-Canada trade, and
almost one-half of Canada’s vertical specialization (see Table 1). A key feature of the calibrated
model, then, will be a two-sector framework, with autos and non-autos.20
The parameters and variables that are calibrated include the labor endowments of each region;
the weight of the auto sector in preferences; the intermediate input shares, θ1 and θ2; the Frechét
heterogeneity parameter n, and the Frechét mean productivity parameters T. From the discussion
18In 1990, over 75 percent of Canada’s exports went to United States. Also, AvW (2003) estimated a two-country
model (U.S. and Canada) and a multi-country model (U.S., Canada, and the rest-of-the-world). The estimates and
border eﬀect implications are very similar.
19The template or model for the CUSFTA in 1989 was the 1965 U.S.-Canada Auto Pact that essentially established
free trade in automobiles between producers. In the ﬁve years following the Auto Pact, auto trade between the two
countries soared from essentially zero to about 25-30 percent of total U.S.-Canada trade, a percentage that has
remained essentially constant since then. A huge component of this trade is vertical specialization. The Auto Pact
speciﬁed some domestic content restrictions; however, the available evidence suggests that these restrictions were set
at the prevailing rates from that period. Also, some of these restrictions were expressed as values instead of shares;
they became largely non-binding constraints after a few years.
20Note that in the model, wages are equalized across the two sectors in each region. The data are broadly consistent
with this implication. In Canada, value-added per worker in 1990 was $56,300 in autos and $54,400 in non-autos. In
the U.S., the numbers were $50,700 and $57,100, respectively.
18in the previous section, the key parameters determining the magniﬁcation eﬀect are θ1and θ2.T h e
intermediate shares, along with n, are key in determining the overall responsiveness of trade to the
trade costs. I also construct the trade cost measures for each region and sector. The trade costs
include tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers, transport costs, and wholesale distribution costs.
The underlying calibration strategy is straightforward. The labor endowments, the auto sector
preference share, and intermediate input shares are set to match their data counterparts. The
Frechét heterogeneity parameter n is taken from the existing literature. The Frechét mean pro-
ductivity parameters are set so that the model matches gross output and value-added in each
region-sector, as well as value-added per worker in each region. The challenge for the model is
whether the trade cost data, fed into the model, will imply an allocation of stage 1 and stage 2
output to the diﬀerent regions, i.e., the pattern of overall and sectoral trade and vertical special-
ization, in a way that matches the pattern of sectoral and overall trade and vertical specialization
in the data.
At this point, it is useful to elaborate on the similarities and diﬀerences between my methodology
and the usual methodology, as well as the reasons for my approach. The primary similarity with
the empirical border eﬀect literature is that it is quantitative. An additional similarity with AvW
(2003) and EK (2002), and related research, is that it is structural. Two key diﬀerences are that I
pursue a calibration approach, rather than an estimation approach, and that I use data on trade
costs to feed into the model. One advantage of using actual data on trade costs is that I do not
need to estimate an ad hoc functional form that maps distance into trade costs. Specifying and
estimating a distance cost function for intra-national and international trade ﬂows has been quite
vexing, as discussed in AvW (2004).21 A second advantage of using actual data on trade costs
is that I can compare the implications of the model for trade ﬂows against actual data on trade
ﬂows. Finally, multi-stage production renders the model suﬃciently complex that there are no
natural estimable equations such as equation 20 in AvW or equation 30 in EK.22 Overall, I view
my approach as complementary to existing approaches.
21Also, see [20] and [23].
22In order to estimate the model, an approach such as simulated method of moments would need to be pursued.
It might be possible to run a reduced form regression of border eﬀects on the number of production stages to see if
this link is present empirically. However, data on the number of production stages by industry does not exist and
appears to be diﬃcult to construct.
193.1 Model Calibration
I divide Canada into two regions, Ontario-Quebec (OQ) and the rest-of-Canada (ROC). The latter
consists of all other provinces other than the Northwest Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut. This
makes sense both from a geographic perspective, as well as from a sectoral production perspective.
Ontario and Quebec are the manufacturing centers of Canada, while the rest of Canada specializes
more heavily in agriculture, oil, and other commodities. The United States is treated as a single
region. U.S. labor is the numeraire; the U.S. wage is set to 1. I focus on 1990, which is in between
the two years that McCallum and AvW focus on (1988 and 1993, respectively). As with most of
the existing research, I also focus only on merchandise — agriculture, mining, and manufacturing —
production and ﬂows.
McCallum (1995) and AvW conduct their empirical analysis with data from individual provinces
and states; the unit of observation is considerably more disaggregated than mine. Does the border
eﬀect puzzle disappear once the data are aggregated to just two regions in Canada and one region
in the United States? Theoretically, aggregation should not matter. I run the standard gravity
regression linking bilateral trade to each region’s GDP, the distance between the two regions, and
a dummy variable for whether the two regions are in the same country.23 Table 2 below indicates
that even with just nine observations, the regression coeﬃcient on the border dummy is close to
the McCallum coeﬃcient; the coeﬃcients on GDP and on distance are also similar.
Table 2: Comparison of McCallum and 3-region gravity regression
ln(tradeij)=β0 + β1 ln(gdpi)+β2 ln(gdpj)+β3 ln(distij)+β4DUMMYij
β1 β2 β3 β4 nobs exp(β4)
McCallum (1995) 1.21 1.06 -1.42 3.09 683 22.0
3-region 0.93 1.04 -0.92 3.16 9 23.6
Factor endowments are speciﬁed as follows. From the OECD’s STAN database, Canada’s
employment in merchandise-producing industries was 2.4 million in 1990, which was 12.8 percent
of U.S. employment of 18.8 million.24 From Statistics Canada’s labor force survey estimates,
23See the data appendix for a description of the data sources.
24To make the U.S. data compatible with a calibration in which the world consists of the U.S. and Canada only,
I adjust the U.S. export, output, and employment data. Speciﬁcally, I subtract U.S. exports to all countries but
Canada from U.S. exports and from U.S. gross output. I also calculate gross output per worker in the autos sector
and the non-autos sector and use the pattern of exports to adjust U.S. employment.
20employment in OQ in 1990 was 67.0 percent of total Canadian employment (in these industries).25
Consequently, OQ’s labor force is set to 0.0855 of the U.S. labor force, and ROC’s labor force is
set to 0.0421 of the U.S. labor force. I assume labor is not mobile across regions, but it is mobile
within a region. In other words, wages or value-added per worker are equalized within a region,
but not necessarily across regions.
In the model, labor is the only factor of production. With constant returns to scale production,
wages and value-added per worker are the same. Of course, in the data there is a distinction between
these two variables. Should the model be calibrated to match labor shares or value-added shares (in
gross output)? This choice matters for calibrating two parameters, the intermediate input shares
and the mean of the productivity distribution. I adopt the latter calibration.26 Relative to the
former approach, this approach results in a lower intermediate input share, which will reduce the
magniﬁcation eﬀect. Because Canada’s value-added per worker relative to the U.S. is somewhat
higher than its average wage relative to the U.S. (0.960 vs. 0.882) this will lead to somewhat higher
mean productivity parameters, Ti,which implies a greater likelihood that Canadian consumers and
ﬁrms will purchase goods produced in Canada. Hereafter, references to wages will denote value-
added per worker.
Turning to the intermediate shares, θ1 and θ2,w h e nθ1 = θ2 = θ, it can be shown that the
value-added/gross output ratio is 1 − θ. From the STAN database, the value-added/gross output
ratio in 1990 for the U.S. and Canada, taken together, was 0.218 for autos and 0.376 for non-autos.
Consequently, I set θautos
1 = θautos
2 =0 .782,a n dθnon−autos
1 = θnon−autos
2 =0 .624.
Because autos have a higher intermediate input share than non-autos, the share of autos in
ﬁnal expenditure is greater than the share of autos in value-added. It is 7.63 percent. Because all
goods in the utility function have equal weight, I implement the two sectors by simply denoting the
range [0,0.0763] as auto sector goods, and the range [0.0763,1] as non-auto sector goods. This has
the same eﬀect as a nested utility function in which the lower nest consists of a [0,1] continuum
of goods combined in a Cobb-Douglas aggregator for each sector, and the upper nest consists of a
Cobb-Douglas function of the auto aggregate and the non-auto aggregate, with the auto aggregate
having a weight of 0.0763, and the non-auto aggregate having a weight of 0.9237.
The other key trade elasticity parameter is the heterogeneity in productivity parameter, n.
As stated above, this corresponds to an elasticity of substitution in monopolistic competition or
25See Statistics Canada Table 282-0007.
26EK adopt the former calibration.
21Armington aggregator models of n +1 .27 (Hereafter, I refer to the elasticity-equivalent of the pa-
rameter.) This elasticity is assumed identical across regions and countries. EK’s estimates of n
range from 3.6 to 12.86. Most of AvW’s (2003) results are presented for elasticities of 5, 8,a n d
10. Baier and Bergstrand (2001), and Head and Ries (2001), estimate substitution elasticities of
6.43 and 7.9, respectively. In the previous section, I demonstrated that under multi-stage produc-
tion the responsiveness of trade to trade costs depends on both the elasticity of substitution and
the “magniﬁcation eﬀect”. Consequently, existing estimates of the substitution elasticity may be
upwardly biased. Hence, I set n =4 .
The ﬁnal parameters are the 12 productivity parameters, T, distinguished by region, sector,
and stage of production (3 × 2 × 2=1 2 ). With no loss of generality, I normalize all U.S. T0st o1.
This leaves the 8 productivity parameters for Canada. There is very little data to provide guidance
on calibrating the mean productivity of a region-sector’s stage 1 production relative to the mean
productivity of a region-sector’s stage 2 production.28 Consequently, I set each region-sector’s stage
1 and stage 2 productivity parameters equal to each other, with one exception. The exception is
for OQ, which accounted for 93 percent of Canada’s exports of autos in 1990. OQ specializes
in auto assembly. In 1990, about 2/3 of Canada’s auto exports were ﬁnal vehicles, while about
2/3 of Canada’s auto imports were engines and parts. Hence, for OQ, T
OQ,autos
2 is a stand-alone
























2 ). I set these four parameters to match the following targets: value-added
per worker in OQ, value-added per worker in ROC, auto labor in OQ, and auto labor in ROC. 29 In
other words, I set these four parameters so that labor market equilibrium delivers value-added per
worker and labor allocations in each region-sector that match the data. This calibration ensures
that the model will match the data for total gross output and total value-added in each region-
sector. As stated above, the challenge for the calibrated model is whether it will deliver the trade
ﬂows and the vertical specialization ﬂows — the pattern of specialization — in the data. Table 3
27See Eaton and Kortum (2002, p. 1750, fn. 20) or Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, p. 710).
28A natural approach to consider would be to obtain measures of output and factor inputs for each region-sector-
stage and back out a Solow residual; however, this would be a very diﬃcult exercise because there is no data set on
factor inputs and outputs by stage of production. Yi (2003) divides the input-output table into stage 1 industries
and stage 2 industries, and uses Balassa revealed comparative advantage (RCA) measures to back out relative
productivities according to stage. However, the RCA measures are constructed from trade data, which is what I am
trying to explain. (Yi (2003) focuses on explaining the growth, not the level, of trade.)
29I impute labor in the auto sector for each Canadian region as follows: In 1992, 78.3 percent of auto shipments
were from OQ. I assume this number holds for 1990, as well. Also, I assume value-added in autos is proportional to
shipments (as is the case in the model). I then use the value-added per worker data for each region to back out the
number of workers.
22provides a list of all parameters, including those that are speciﬁed in advance and those that are
set to hit speciﬁct a r g e t s .
The calibration of the one-stage model is similar. The parameters set in advance are identical.
The four productivity parameters, TOQ,autos,TOQ,non−autos,TROC,autos, and TROC,non−autos, are set
to match the four targets listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Targets
OQ labor relative to U.S. (LOQ/LU.S.)0 .0855
ROC labor relative to U.S. (LROC/LU.S.)0 .0421
Size of auto sector (fraction of ﬁnal expenditure) 0.0763
Intermediate input share, θautos
1 = θautos
2 0.782
Intermediate input share, θnon−autos
1 = θnon−autos
2 0.624




















2 ) wROC/wU.S. (1.063)
3.2 Trade Costs
I now construct the data counterparts of the trade costs between region i and region j, τij.T h e s e
include tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs), transportation costs, and wholesale distribution costs
for autos and for non-autos within and between the three regions.30 The computations rely heavily
on data drawn from input-output tables for the U.S., Canada, Ontario and Quebec. Some of these
tables, especially the provincial input-output tables, became available only recently. I allow for
asymmetry in the costs.31 For international exports, these tables and other oﬃcial data sources
cover the transportation and wholesale costs only to the national border. To obtain the costs after
the good crosses the border, I make two assumptions. For transport costs, I assume the cost equals
the cost of an export shipment in the opposite direction. For wholesale distribution costs, I assume
30I do not measure retail margins. I assume that retail margins are identical across goods, regardless of production
location. For example, the U.S. retail margins on a Chevrolet produced in the U.S. are assumed to be identical to the
retail margins on a Chevrolet produced in Canada and exported to the U.S. Under this assumption, retail margins
will not aﬀect trade ﬂows.
31Waugh (2007) ﬁnds that these asymmetries are important in explaining per capita income diﬀerences across
countries.
23the cost equals the cost of a domestic shipment. The data appendix describes the sources and
calculations in detail and also provides a decomposition of each of the three main categories of
costs.
Tables 4 and 5 below presents the total costs expressed in ad valorem terms for autos and
non-autos in 1990. Trade costs for autos are typically about half that for non-autos. Trade costs
within regions are the lowest, and international trade costs are the highest, with inter-regional costs
in between. For example, the cost of shipping autos from OQ to OQ is 8.96 percent, but the cost
of exporting them to the U.S. is 13.8 percent; the cost of shipping them to ROC is 12.0 percent.
The international costs are higher for three reasons. First, the tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers aﬀect
only international trade. Second, the transport costs are higher for international trade. The costs
are higher because it is as costly or more costly to ship the goods to the border than to ship them
to the same region or another region in the same country, and because there are additional costs
to ship the good from the border to the ultimate destination. Finally, the wholesale distribution
costs are also higher, for similar reasons. Overall, however, the international trade costs are not
large. What matters for trade ﬂows are international trade costs relative to intra-national trade
costs. Computing trade-weighted averages of these two costs yields an overall relative international
trade cost of 7.4 percent for autos and 15.5 percent for non-autos. Auto costs are lower because
the tariﬀs are lower, transport costs are lower — a large fraction of auto plants in Canada are in
the part of Ontario between Toronto and Windsor — and wholesale distribution costs are lower.
(See appendix tables.) The lower auto trade costs will clearly deliver higher trade and vertical
specialization ﬂows, but whether they deliver the large auto share of trade and the large vertical
specialization ﬂows in the data is an open question. 32
32A key assumption of the model is that as goods travel back-and-forth across countries, they incur these trade
costs multiple times. This is natural for tariﬀ barriers and non-tariﬀ barriers, as well as for the transportation
costs. I assume this is also true for wholesale distribution costs. I thank Tom Holmes and Rebecca Hellerstein for
conversations with me on this subject.
24Table 4: Auto Trade Costs (percent)
From
Ontario-Quebec Rest-of-Canada U.S.
Ontario-Quebec 8.96 11.7 20.6
To Rest-of-Canada 12.0 8.09 19.3
U.S. 13.8 12.2 8.28
Sources: see Appendix
Table 5: Non-Auto Trade Costs (percent)
From
Ontario-Quebec Rest-of-Canada U.S.
Ontario-Quebec 14.1 20.5 39.6
To Rest-of-Canada 20.2 12.8 44.2
U.S. 29.7 35.0 17.7
Sources: see Appendix
3.3 Solution
Given the parameterization of the model in Table 3 and the trade costs data in Tables 4 and 5,
the model will deliver an equilibrium set of factor prices, goods prices, production quantities, trade
ﬂows, and vertical specialization ﬂows. As mentioned above, I solve for the productivity parameters
that yields value-added per worker in each region, as well as employment in each region and sector,
that match their data counterparts.
Unlike in EK, an exact solution to the model cannot be computed. Instead, I must ﬁnd an
approximate solution. To do so, I approximate the [0,1] continuum with 1,500,000 equally spaced
intervals; each interval corresponds to one good.33 Further details on the solution method are in
the appendix.
33As an accuracy check, I solve the EK model using the approximate solution method I employ. I replicate the
exact EK model solution up to three signiﬁcant digits.
254R e s u l t s
I now assess the quantitative importance of multi-stage production in explaining intra-national
and international trade patterns for the United States and Canada. I solve both the multi-stage
production model (hereafter, "benchmark" model) and the one-stage version of the model. A
convenient way to characterize the model-implied trade ﬂo w si st or u nt h eM c C a l l u mg r a v i t y
regression. Note that I do not give a structural interpretation to the estimated coeﬃcients; this
is a key lesson from AvW. Rather, I use the regression as a reduced form way to characterize the
model-implied trade ﬂows. Table 6 presents the main results.
Table 6: Regressions with Actual or Model-Implied Trade
ln(xij)=β0 + β1 ln(yi)+β2 ln(yj)+β3 ln(distij)+β4DUMMYij
β1 β2 β3 β4 exp(β4)
Actual data 0.93 1.04 -0.92 3.16 23.6
Benchmark multi-stage model 0.95 0.95 -0.27 2.15 8.59
Multi-stage model with one sector 0.92 0.92 -0.27 1.94 6.96
One-stage model 0.89 0.89 -0.14 0.98 2.68
The second row of the table presents the results for the benchmark model. The regression
coeﬃcient on the border dummy variable is 2.15, which is more than 2/3 the value estimated from
the actual data. The empirical border eﬀect implied by the model is 8.59; the model can explain
about 3/8 of the border eﬀect in the data. This is a sizeable fraction resulting from our estimated
international trade costs of only 14.8 percent. Nevertheless, because the implied border coeﬃcient is
less than the coeﬃcient estimated from the actual data, the model over-predicts international trade
ﬂows and under-predicts inter-regional and intra-regional ﬂows. For example, the model predicts
that OQ exports to the U.S. are about twice their actual value, and that OQ imports from itself are
about half their actual value. The model’s coeﬃcient on distance is far from the data coeﬃcient,
but the model is close to matching the coeﬃcients on output.
What does the one-stage model imply? The fourth row of the table shows that the regression
coeﬃcient on the border dummy variable is 0.98. This is less than 1/3 the value estimated from
the actual data. The coeﬃcient implies a border eﬀect of 2.68, less than 1/3 of the border eﬀect
implied by the benchmark model, and only about 1/9 of the data. The model predicts that OQ
exports to the U.S. are about three times their actual value, and that OQ imports from itself are
26about one-fourth their actual value. The model’s coeﬃcients on output are also close to the data
coeﬃcients, but it does worse than the benchmark model in matching the coeﬃcient on distance.
The main result from the one-stage model is that it generates a considerably worse ﬁtt ot h et r a d e
data: less than half as good as the benchmark model with respect to the border dummy coeﬃcient,
and less than one-third as good with respect to the empirical border eﬀect.
To assess the importance of heterogeneity across the two sectors, I calibrate and solve a single
sector version of the model. The parameters and trade costs are production-weighted averages
across both sectors. For example, the intermediate input share is 0.637. The third row of the
table shows the results. The border coeﬃcient is considerably larger than the one-stage model’s
coeﬃcient, and somewhat smaller than the benchmark model’s coeﬃcient. Hence, multi-stage
production is the major reason why the border coeﬃcient is large, with heterogeneity across sectors
also playing a role.34
A test of the benchmark model is how well it captures international vertical specialization for
Canada. The model implies that Canada’s international vertical specialization ﬂows, VS, expressed
as a share of total merchandise GDP, is 22.5 percent for OQ and 10.5 percent for ROC. Table 1
above shows that the data values are 30.7 percent and 11.0 percent, respectively. So the model
closely matches vertical specialization in ROC, and captures two-thirds of the vertical specialization
in OQ.
Does the benchmark model capture the importance of the auto industry in VS and trade? While
the model generates a disproportional importance of autos for both VS and trade, it falls short of
generating the sector’s actual importance, as Table 7 shows.
Table 7: Auto Sector’s Importance in OQ’s VS and International Trade
VS/GDP Share of Total VS Share of Trade
Data 0.173 0.564 0.313
Benchmark multi-stage model 0.060 0.265 0.123
Multi-stage model with one sector 0.020 0.076 0.077
Table 7 focuses on OQ because the vast majority of auto production occurs there. The second
row of the table shows that the benchmark model implies that OQ’s VS for autos is 6.0 percent of
34Hillberry (2003) also ﬁnds that heterogeneity in trade costs matters. He estimates industry level border eﬀects in
Canada, and ﬁnds that the industry average is lower than the national border eﬀect estimated from aggregate data.
27(total merchandise) GDP; this is only about one-third of the actual value. The model also implies
that autos account for 26.5 percent of OQ’s total VS; this is about half of the data value. Finally,
the benchmark model implies that auto trade accounts for 12.3 percent of total OQ trade, but in
the data the auto share of trade is about two-and-one-half times larger. Thus, the model fails to
deliver the extent of auto’s role in OQ’s VS and trade; however, it is useful to remember that autos
represent less than 8 percent of ﬁnal expenditure. In the model with just one sector, (in which there
is no heterogeneity between auto goods and non-autos goods other than the weight in preferences),
autos have considerably smaller shares of VS/GDP, total VS and trade, as the ﬁnal row of Table 7
shows.
What happens when the key elasticity parameter, n, increases? International trade ﬂows become
more sensitive to trade costs, leading to a decline in such trade and an increase in intra-national
trade. This will lead to a higher implied border eﬀect. I ﬁnd that when n =7 .51, the multi-
stage production model can match the border dummy coeﬃcient in the data.35 That is, with this
elasticity and the trade costs I measured, the model explains the pattern of intra-national and
international trade within and between the United States and Canada. However, as elasticities
increase, international vertical specialization ﬂows are aﬀected even more adversely than standard
international trade ﬂows. When n =7 .51, the model generates extremely counterfactual implica-
tions for international vertical specialization ﬂows: 4.7 percent for OQ and 0.9 percent for ROC.
This captures in a nut shell why simply raising elasticities does not resolve the border eﬀect puzzle.
It may “explain” low international trade relative to intra-national trade, but it will not explain
Canada’s vertical specialization ﬂows.
All of the above analysis was with the trade costs I measured. I now subject the benchmark
model to a reverse engineering exercise: What level of international trade costs is needed for the
model to exactly match the border coeﬃcient in the data? I address this by ﬁnding the number
that multiplies (gross) international trade costs (only) in the two sectors so that the model implies
the trade ﬂows that yield the border dummy coeﬃcient in the data. I ﬁnd the multiplicative
factor is 1.099. This translates into average international trade costs of 18.0 percent for autos,
26.8 percent for non-autos, and 26.1 percent overall. Put diﬀerently, in the presence of multi-stage
production, the unobserved or unknown trade costs owing to currency diﬀerences, regulatory and
35With that elasticity, the coeﬃcient implied by the one-stage model is 1.82, which translates to an empirical border
eﬀect of 6.19. Consequently, with this elasticity, the multi-stage production model could “explain” all of the border
eﬀect, while the one-stage model would explain only about 1/4 of it.
28cultural factors, and other barriers, add up to only 26.1 − 14.8=1 1 .3 percentage points.36 This
result helps establish bounds on how large these other costs are.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper oﬀers multi-stage production as an explanation for the home bias in trade puzzle. The
presence of multi-stage production — which carries with it the possibility of vertical specialization
— magniﬁes the eﬀects of trade costs. I showed that there are two magniﬁcation forces. The
“back and forth” trade associated with vertical specialization means that at least some stages of
production bear multiple trade costs. Also, because diﬀerent stages can be produced in diﬀerent
countries, sometimes the marginal production process is a single stage or a subset of stages. Then
the “eﬀective” trade cost is the trade cost divided by the share of the marginal stages’ value-added
in the total cost. Hence, under multi-stage production, a given level of trade costs can explain more
of the puzzle, relative to a framework with one stage of production, because it leads to a greater
reduction of international trade and a greater increase in intra-national trade.
Multi-stage production and vertical specialization break the tight link between the elasticity of
trade with respect to iceberg-type trade barriers and the elasticity of substitution between goods
(on either the production or consumption side) that is present in the EK model, the monopolistic
competition model, and the Armington aggregator models. In these models the two elasticities
are virtually identical. In a special case of the model, I demonstrate that the elasticity of trade
with respect to barriers involves both the elasticity of substitution (i.e., the Frechét distribution
variance parameter) and the share of stage 1 inputs used in stage 2 production. This suggests
that there may be an upward bias in estimates of the substitution elasticity that do not control for
multi-stage production. Chaney (2007) presents a model with ﬁrm heterogeneity and ﬁxed costs
that also breaks the link between the elasticity of trade with respect to barriers and the elasticity
of substitution. Ruhl (2008) is a quantitative analysis of a similar mechanism in which there is a
distinction between the short run and the long run.
The main contribution of the paper is quantitative. I develop a multi-stage, multi-region Ri-
cardian model of trade and then pursue a calibration approach to evaluating the model’s ability to
address the home bias puzzle. I directly measure three types of trade costs — tariﬀ rates and NTBs,
36I do the same exercise for the one-stage model. I ﬁnd that when average international trade costs are 41.6 percent
for autos and 52.2 percent for non-autos, or 51.5 percent overall. This implies that the unobserved or unknown trade
costs are 36.7 percent, or more than twice as large as the trade costs I measured.
29transport costs, and wholesale distribution costs — for the U.S. and Canada in 1990. Aided by new
data from Statistics Canada, my paper also measures trade costs for autos and for non-autos; the
auto sector plays a large role in U.S.-Canada trade and vertical specialization ﬂows. I ﬁnd that
the international trade costs are 7.4 percent for autos, 15.5 percent for non-autos, and 14.8 percent
overall. I calibrate the model to match output, value-added, and value-added per worker in each
region in each sector. The challenge for the model, then, is to match the allocation of output to
the diﬀerent regions. In particular, the challenge is for the lower trade costs in the auto sector to
generate a large volume of trade, while at the same time, the higher trade costs in the non-auto
sector generate very little international trade so that a large border eﬀect occurs.
I solve the model and estimate the usual gravity regression with the model-implied trade ﬂows. I
ﬁnd that the model can explain almost 3/8 of the border eﬀect. By contrast, a calibrated one-stage
model can explain only about 1/9 of the border eﬀect. The model generates a magniﬁed role for the
auto sector, but the extent of the magniﬁcation falls short of what is in the data. An independent
test of the model is its ability to explain the extent of vertical specialization. There is a good ﬁt,
overall, but again, it fails to capture the large role played the auto sector. The fact that the most
of the auto ﬁrms in Canada are aﬃliates of U.S. multinational parents may be a reason for this.37
Clearly, there are additional trade costs beyond tariﬀs and NTBs, transportation costs, and
wholesale distribution costs. Measuring these costs — lack of a common currency or language,
information barriers, regulatory burdens, security concerns, cultural diﬀerences, time, etc. — is an
important task for future research.38 However, the results from my reverse engineering exercise
suggest that in the presence of multi-stage production and its magniﬁcation eﬀect, there is an
upper bound on the size of these costs, on the order of 10 percent. Put diﬀerently, the beneﬁts of
a common language or a common currency may not be as large as had been previously thought.
On the other hand, my ﬁndings suggests that changes in tariﬀs are still important, and policies
encouraging investment in transportation infrastructure may be, as well.
In the model, there are just two stages of production. Many goods are made in at least three
stages. Indeed, within North America, some auto parts are already part of a three-stage vertical
specialization chain: parts are made in the United States, they are exported to Mexico, where they
are assembled into engines, they are exported back to the United States where they are installed
in autos, and some of these autos are exported to Canada. Allowing for additional stages would
37See Feinberg and Keane (2006) for a study of the special role of multinationals in U.S.-Canada trade.
38Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) is a comprehensive survey of trade costs. Most of the costs listed above are
measured indirectly.
30likely enhance the explanatory power of a multi-stage production framework.
In my framework, the trade costs enter in an ad valorem way. Recent empirical research suggests
the importance of ﬁxed or sunk costs in international trade costs.39 It would be useful to extend
the framework to include ﬁxed costs of exporting, as in Melitz (2003), Chaney (2007), Alessandria
and Choi (2008), and Ruhl (2008). If ﬁxed costs are increasing in the number of border crossings,
it seems plausible that multi-stage production can generate magniﬁcation eﬀects along the lines
obtained with ad valorem costs.
This paper pursued the home bias in trade puzzle from the perspective of trade ﬂows. There is
a separate and important literature that examines the puzzle from the perspective of prices. See,
for example, Engel and Rogers (1996), Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2007), and Broda and Weinstein
(2008). It would be useful to merge these two literatures. For a given set of trade costs, just
as multi-stage production produces magniﬁcation in terms of trade ﬂows, multi-stage production
would produce magniﬁcation in terms of prices, as well. Moreover, the magniﬁed eﬀects on trade
ﬂows occur precisely because of their magniﬁed eﬀect on prices.
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Solution for zh in the one-stage model
For each good consumed in the home country, there are two production methods: it can be produced
at home or abroad. I follow DFS by ordering the continuum of goods according to declining home
country comparative advantage. There is a cutoﬀ zh for which goods on the interval [0,zh ] are
produced by the home country, and goods on the interval [zh,1] are produced by the foreign country.
This cutoﬀ is determined by the arbitrage condition that the price of purchasing this good (by a
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(1 + b) (29)
Solving for zh yields (19).
39See Roberts and Tybout (1997), Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004),
for example.
31A.2 Solution for zh in the multi-stage production model special case
For goods ultimately consumed in the home country, there are two production methods, HH and
HF. As above, ordering the continuum of goods according to declining home country comparative
advantage in stage 2 production, there is a cutoﬀ zh for which goods on the interval [0,zh ] are
produced by HH, and goods on the interval [zh,1] are produced by HF. This cutoﬀ is determined
by the arbitrage condition that the price of purchasing this good (by a home country consumer) is
the same across the two methods:
pHH






























(1 + b)(1+θ2) (32)
Solving for zh yields (24).
A.3 Border eﬀect with multi-stage production when barriers are value-added
When border costs such as tariﬀs are applied only to the value-added that occurred in the exporting
country, then (30) now becomes:
pHH
2 (zh ) ≡ (1 + b(1 − θ2))pHF
2 (zh ) (33)
Solving for zh as before, and then plugging it into the expression for the border eﬀect yields:
h
(1 + b)θ2(1 + b(1 − θ2))
i n
1−θ2 (34)
When θ2 ≥ 1/2, (34) is clearly greater than (1+b)n.W h e n0 <θ 2 < 1/2,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
f(θ2)=
£
(1 + b)θ2(1 + b(1 − θ2))
¤ 1
1−θ2 −(1+b),f o rw h i c hf( 0 )=0and f(0.5) > 0,i sc o n c a v e .T h i s
implies that for this range of θ2, (34) exceeds (1 + b)n. Hence, the magniﬁcation eﬀect still holds.





With this approximation, it can be seen that the 1+θ2
1−θ2 term from the “gross” barrier case is
replaced by 1




Tariﬀsa n dN T B s Table 2 in Lester and Morehen (1988) provides data on U.S. tariﬀso nC a n a -
dian goods and Canadian tariﬀs on U.S. goods, quantitative restrictions between the two countries,
and federal procurement policies for 31 goods-producing industries for 1987. The latter two barri-
ers are non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs). Lester and Morehen began with the most favored nation tariﬀ
rates on individual commodities and used import and production weights to create aggregate tariﬀ
measures for each of the 31 industries. The 31 industries correspond closely to SIC 2-digit level
industries. One of these industries is autos (motor vehicles). The tariﬀ-equivalent of the quantita-
tive restrictions is calculated "as the diﬀerence between the observed producer price in Canada and
the comparable world price (adjusted for tariﬀs and transportation charges)" (p. 19). The tariﬀ-
equivalent of the federal procurement policies is calculated as "the tariﬀ rate required to reduce
total imports by the same amount as the change in government imports attributable to preferential
procurement practices" (p. 21).
These data are converted into tariﬀs plus NTBs for the U.S. vis-a-vis Ontario-Quebec (OQ) and
vis-a-vis the rest of Canada (ROC) in two steps. First, the tariﬀs for 1987 were updated to 1990
using the "staging list" for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), obtained from Keith
Head. The staging list provides the timing of the phasing out of tariﬀs for each industry. Most
phaseouts were linear and occurred over a period of 5 to 10 years. The NTBs for 1990 are assumed
to equal the NTBs for 1987. Second, Statistics Canada data on trade ﬂows between Ontario-Quebec
and the U.S. and between the rest of Canada and the U.S. were used to create import-weighted
aggregate tariﬀ plus NTB measures for each region. The tariﬀ+NTB rate for non-autos is computed
as the appropriately weighted diﬀerence between the overall aggregate tariﬀ+NTB rate and the
autos tariﬀ+NTB rate.
Transport cost and wholesale margins for intra-national trade
1. United States. Transport cost margins and wholesale margins for intra-national U.S. trade for
autos and for non-autos were calculated from the 1992 U.S. input-output tables, and include
both intermediate and ﬁnal demand.
2. Canada. Transport cost and wholesale margin data for intra-national Canada trade in autos
and in non-autos were obtained from the Input-Output division of Statistics Canada (Stat-
Can) and from StatCan Table 386-0001 for 1992. I assume the transport cost margins and
wholesale margins (in ad valorem terms) are the same in 1990 as in 1992. Several adjustments
were made to the Canadian trade data, because the 1992 data are incomplete; I used data
from the 1997 intra-national trade tables constructed under the same methodology as the
1992 tables, as well as data from a set of 1997 tables constructed under a newer methodology,
to impute the missing trade values. To calculate the transport cost margins for autos, I used
the overall within-Canada transport cost margin for autos, and an additional assumption that
the transport cost margins within and between OQ and ROC for autos are proportional to the
transport cost margins within and between OQ and ROC for all goods, with the constant of
proportionality set so that average transport cost margin matches the overall within-Canada
transport cost margin for autos (obtained from the Canada input-output table). I do a similar
exercise for non-autos, and for the wholesale margins. Further details are available from the
author on request.
33Transport cost and wholesale margins for international trade Calculating transport cost
and wholesale margins for international trade involves two steps: First, calculate the transport
cost and wholesale margin associated with shipping a good from the factory to the border; second,
calculate the transport cost and wholesale margin associated with shipping the good from the
border to its ultimate destination.
1. Transport costs, ﬁrst step. I use input-output tables from the BEA and StatCan, trade data
and margins data from StatCan, and inland freight data from the U.S. Census Bureau
(a) For U.S. auto exports to OQ and ROC, I assume the transport cost margin equals the
transport cost margin for U.S. auto exports to the world. These data are from the 1992
U.S. input-output tables. I assume the margins in 1990 equal the margins in 1992. For
U.S. non-auto exports to OQ or to ROC, I compute the value of the margin so that the
import-weighted sum of the U.S. autos and non-autos export margins equals the Census
Bureau estimate of the cost of inland freight for U.S. exports to Canada. The Census
estimate for 1990 was 4.5%.
(b) For OQ and ROC exports to the U.S., I use data for 1992 from StatCan Table 386-0001
and two StatCan publications, "Interprovincial and International Trade, 1992-1998"
and "Interprovincial and International Trade, 1984-1996", as well as the 1997 provincial
input-output tables. I assume the export margins in 1990 are the same as in 1992; I also
assume the export margin to the U.S. equals the export margin to the world. I impute
the export margins for autos and for non-autos from the export margin for all goods by
using the export shares of autos and non-autos, and by employing the assumption that
the ratio of the auto export margin to the non-auto export margin in 1992 equals the
ratio in 1997.
2. Transport costs, second step. I employ a symmetry assumption.40 I assume the costs of
shipping U.S. autos from the U.S.-Canada border to OQ, for example, are equal to the costs
of shipping OQ-made autos to the U.S.-Canada border, i.e., the costs of shipping goods in
the reverse direction, and similarly for non-autos. Also, I assume the costs of shipping an OQ
or ROC auto from the U.S.-Canada border to its ultimate destination are the same as the
costs of shipping a U.S.-made auto to the U.S.-Canada border, and similarly for non-autos.
3. Wholesale margins, ﬁrst step. I use input-output tables from the BEA and Statistics Canada,
as well as data from the U.S. Census Bureau. I assume the margins for 1990 equal the margins
for 1992.
(a) For U.S. auto exports, I assume the wholesale margin equals the wholesale margin for
U.S. auto exports to the world. These data are from the 1992 U.S. input-output tables.
For U.S. non-auto exports to OQ, I calculate the OQ-import-weighted average of the
industry-level U.S. export margins for all non-auto industries (also from the 1992 U.S.
input-output tables), and similarly for ROC. The import weights are based on 1990
import data from StatCan.
(b) The ﬁrst step wholesale margins for OQ exports and for ROC exports are computed
from the same sources and with the same methodology as the ﬁrst step transport costs
for OQ and ROC exports.
40Rousslang and To (1993) employ similar assumptions.
344. Wholesale margins, second step. I employ a symmetry assumption. The second step wholesale
margins for OQ and ROC exports are assumed to be the same as within-U.S. wholesale
margins; that is, once the Canadian good crosses into the U.S., the wholesale margin to
distribute the good to the retailer is assumed to be the same as the wholesale margin for a
U.S. good that is shipped to a retailer. The second step wholesale margins for U.S. exports
are assumed to be the same as the within-OQ or within-ROC wholesale margins.41
Tables Trade costs for the three categories are listed below in percent. The costs are added (I
assume that each cost is applied to the factory gate price) to yield the total trade costs in Tables
4 and 5 of the text.




To Rest-of-Canada 1.16 (6.22)
U.S. 0.230 (3.56) 0.230 (2.37)
Sources: Canada Ministry of Finance; U.N.; U.S. ITC; Head and Ries (2001), Author’s calculations
Table A2: Transportation Costs: Autos (Non-Autos)
From
Ontario-Quebec Rest-of-Canada U.S.
Ontario-Quebec 0.937 (2.23) 3.54 (8.40) 4.49 (8.42)
To Rest-of-Canada 2.08 (5.13) 1.06 (2.49) 4.26 (14.4)
U.S. 4.49 (8.42) 4.26 (14.4) 2.73 (4.65)
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics Canada, U.S. BEA, Author’s calculations
Table A3: Wholesale Costs: Autos (Non-Autos)
From
Ontario-Quebec Rest-of-Canada U.S.
Ontario-Quebec 8.03 (11.9) 8.19 (12.1) 14.9 (25.0)
To Rest-of-Canada 9.96 (15.0) 7.03 (10.3) 13.9 (23.6)
U.S. 9.08 (17.7) 7.72 (18.3) 5.55 (13.1)
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics Canada, U.S. BEA, Author’s calculations
A.4.2 Other Data
All data in U.S. dollars is converted to Canadian dollars using the average exchange rate for 1990,
obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. The data for the gravity regression
41I thank Rebecca Hellerstein and Tom Holmes for useful conversations on the nature of wholesale distribution. In
Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007), beer manufacturers are assumed to use one or more domestic wholesale distributors
to ship beer to the wholesale distributor located near the retail outlet in the foreign country. Multinationals have
manufacturing sales oﬃces that coordinate the shipments of goods from factories to other factories and to retail
outlets. These oﬃces may also hold inventory. Goods produced in OQ, for example, may go through more than one
sales oﬃce on each side of the border, before they reach their ﬁnal destination.
35come from several sources. All trade ﬂow data refer to merchandise ﬂows (agriculture, mining, and
manufacturing) and are for 1990. The intra-national Canada trade ﬂow data are from Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003); they are adjusted to remove ﬂows associated with construction and utilities.
The trade ﬂows between OQ and the U.S. and between ROC and the U.S. are obtained from
Statistics Canada. The intra-national U.S. trade ﬂow data are computed following the approach of
Wei (1996), Helliwell (1998), and others, as gross output in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing
minus merchandise exports. Canadian GDP for 1990 is from Statistics Canada. U.S. GDP for 1990
is from the BEA. Distances between the 3 regions are computed using great circle distance between
each region’s centers — Toronto for OQ, Calgary for ROC, and Chicago for the U.S. Distances within
regions are computed via a slight modiﬁcation of Wei (1996): the within OQ distance is 0.25 times
the average of the great circle distance between Toronto and Calgary and between Toronto and
Chicago, and similarly for the other two regions.
A.5 Solution Method
I compute an approximate solution to the model. I approximate the [0,1] continuum with 1,500,000
equally spaced intervals; each interval corresponds to one good. I reduce the model to nine equations
in the four productivity parameters T, two aggregate intermediates Mi (for OQ and ROC), and the
three aggregate regional price levels Pi. I draw a stage 1 productivity and a stage 2 productivity
from the Frechét distribution for each of the 1,500,000 goods and for each region. Because there
are three regions and two stages of production, ther ea r en i n ep o s s i b l ep r o d u c t i o nm e t h o d sf o re a c h
good. For each region’s consumer, I calculate the cheapest production method (i.e., the locations
of stage 1 and stage 2 production) for each good. I then calculate whether the resulting pattern of
production, trade, and prices is consistent with the data targets, with intermediates goods market
equilibrium, and with the candidate aggregate prices. The model uses a Gauss-Newton algorithm
to adjust the candidate vector until these conditions are met. The algorithm takes about 20-30
minutes in Gauss.
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